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Introduction
In effect, to follow, not to force the public inclination; to give a direction, 
a form, a technical dress, and a specific sanction, to the general sense of 
the community, is the true end of legislation.
—Edmund Burke, "Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol."
In the spring of 2011, following the example of the uprisings in Tunisia 
and Egypt that led to the fall of those countries' leaders, Libyan citizens 
began a series of protests against their leader, Muammar Gaddafi. The 
authorities responded with brutal repression, and the demonstrations 
turned into a revolt that quickly spread to the east of the country and var-
ious parts of the west. The progovernment Al-Zahf al-Akhdar newspaper 
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warned that the Libyan government would "violently and thunderously 
respond" to the protests, having appealed to the army and the air force in 
order to stop the rebellion.1 This resort to military force triggered an 
international response that culminated with the passing of Resolution 
1973 of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) allowing an interven-
tion in Libyan territory by states party to the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization (NATO).
This article will address the issue of the influence of international politics 
in the legality of the Libyan intervention by evaluating the conditions in 
which the Libyan intervention was legitimized by the approval of UN 
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973. Second, the article will 
present an analysis of the voting and sanctioning of the resolution that 
allowed NATO's intervention. The goal of this article is to study the legal 
basis for the Libyan intervention and to recommend further research into 
the complex interaction between international politics and international 
law.2
Conditions for the Legitimization of the Intervention
In the UN debates leading up to Resolution 1973, states wanted to avoid 
the possibility of the intervention being perceived as an imposition of 
Western powers (the United States and its European allies), which was 
precisely what Gaddafi argued the intervention was when faced with its 
possibility.3 Thus, regional acceptance was set as a condition sine qua non 
for an intervention in Libya.
Libya is a member state of two important regional organizations: the Arab 
League and the African Union (AU). On March 12, the Arab League asked 
the United Nations to shoulder its responsibility to impose "a no-fly zone 
on Libyan military aviation, and to establish safe areas in places exposed 
to shelling as a precautionary measure that allows the protection of the 
Libyan people and foreign nationals residing in the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya."4
This request is unique in the history of the League, and was a very impor-
tant argument for intervention by the Western powers, especially the 
United States. It was important that the intervention wasn't perceived as 
an imposition by "imperialist" countries, but as a response providing the 
help asked for by the region. This seminal event set the path for China 
and Russia—who traditionally oppose foreign intervention in internal dis-
putes—not to veto the Security Council's resolution.
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The relative absence of the AU in the debate on intervention, on the other 
hand, was evident; it reacted in a slow and limited way. While it did issue 
a statement expressing "deep concern" over the violence in Libya, the AU 
initially sought a diplomatic solution, and refused a military interven-
tion.5 Consequently, the AU was brushed aside by Western powers, which 
were more interested in the request of the Arab League for intervention.
States clearly wanted to and were ready to intervene early on in Libya, but 
they didn't do it until they had the internationally recognized legitimacy 
to do so, both politically and legally. Politically, Western powers recog-
nized the need for regional support. Legally, they needed a rule that 
allowed them to intervene—in this case, a resolution passed by the UNSC 
on the basis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.6 The states that chose to 
constrain their actions until the adoption of UNSCR 1973 revealed how 
international norms are increasingly influential in the consideration of 
state action. The Libyan example provides some compelling indication 
that legitimization is an important concept for modern state interven-
tions: for a state's intervention to have a large support from the interna-
tional community, the existence of a legal basis for such actions is 
necessary.
The necessity of a legal foundation for forceful interventions is compelling 
because states were worried about their reputation as "law-abiders" and 
"defenders of human rights."7 This kind of reputation is very useful for 
governments to acquire as it confers international credibility, legitimacy, 
and political capital. While NATO member states could have acted on 
moral grounds, using justifications such as humanitarian intervention as 
the sole basis for intervention, they chose instead to garner legal legiti-
macy to justify their interests.
Voting and Sanctioning of Resolution 1973
In order to better understand the political context in which this resolution 
was approved and its implications, it is illustrative to analyze how the res-
olution was voted on and sanctioned.
Showing its concern and condemning the acts on the Libyan population, 
just prior to Resolution 1973, the Security Council unanimously adopted 
Resolution 1970 on February 16, 2011. Resolution 1970 establishes, 
among other provisions:8
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•   International Criminal Court (ICC) referral: "Refer the situation in the 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya since 15 February 2011 to the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court."9
•   Humanitarian assistance: "All Member States […] shall facilitate and 
support the return of humanitarian agencies and make available 
humanitarian and related assistance in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
[…]."10
•   Asset freeze: "All Member States shall freeze without delay all funds, 
other financial assets, and economic resources which are on their terri-
tories, which are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly," by Gadd-
afi, certain members of his family and high functionaries.11
•   Arms embargo: "All Member States shall immediately take the neces-
sary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer 
to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya of arms and related materiel of all types 
[…]."12
This resolution set the path to Resolution 1973, of March 17, which 
allowed the intervention in Libya.13 Resolution 1973 was passed with ten 
votes in favor and five abstentions, its main contents being:
•   Denunciation of the flagrant and systematic violation of human rights, 
humanitarian law and refugee law, asking for an immediate cease-fire
•   Authorization of the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
as to ensure a no-fly zone and protect civilian population
•   Authorization to States to take "all necessary measures" to have these 
measures enforced
The countries that abstained in the voting were China, Russia, India, Bra-
zil, and Germany. Their arguments were the following:14
•   China: "China has always emphasized that, in its relevant actions, the 
Security Council should follow the United Nations Charter and the 
norms governing international law, respect the sovereignty, indepen-
dence, unity and territorial integrity of Libya and resolve the current 
crisis in Libya through peaceful means."15
•   Russia: "Unfortunately, […] a whole range of questions raised by Rus-
sia and other members of the Council remained unanswered. Those 
questions were concrete and legitimate and touched on how the no-fly 
zone would be enforced, what the rules of engagement would be and 
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what limits on the use of force there would be. Furthermore, the draft 
was morphing before our very eyes, transcending the initial concept as 
stated by the League of Arab States. Provisions were introduced into 
the text that could potentially open the door to large-scale military 
intervention."16
•   Germany: "We have very carefully considered the option of using mili-
tary force—its implications as well as its limitations. We see great risks. 
The likelihood of large-scale loss of life should not be underestimated. 
If the steps proposed turn out to be ineffective, we see the danger of 
being drawn into a protracted military conflict that would affect the 
wider region."17
•   Brazil: "It is our view that the text of resolution 1973 (2011) contem-
plates measures that go far beyond [the League of Arab States] call. We 
are not convinced that the use of force […] will lead to the realization of 
our common objective—the immediate end to violence and the protec-
tion of civilians. We are also concerned that such measures may have 
the unintended effect of exacerbating tensions on the ground and caus-
ing more harm than good to the very same civilians we are committed 
to protecting."18
•   India: "The Council has today adopted a resolution that authorizes far-
reaching measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 
with relatively little credible information on the situation on the ground 
in Libya. It is of course very important that there be full respect for the 
sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Libya. The financial mea-
sures that are proposed in the resolution could impact directly or 
through indirect routes the ongoing trade and investment activities of a 
number of Member States, thereby adversely affecting the economic 
interests of the Libyan people and others dependent on these trade and 
economic ties."19
It's not a coincidence that the so-called "BRIC" (Brazil, Russia, India, and 
China) countries, along with Germany, abstained from the vote in the 
UNSC. They are all economic powers with special interests in Libyan oil 
contracts.20 Their choice of abstention, rather than an exercise of their 
right to veto, showed that they were probably more concerned with avoid-
ing a direct confrontation with Libya than with rejecting the measures 
laid down in the resolution. In this case, states voted or abstained accord-
ing to their political interests in Libya, but once the international commu-
nity felt the need to intervene, it did.
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Interestingly, when approving Resolution 1973, the United Kingdom 
representative stressed the fact that NATO forces were ready to act; 
however, there was no reference to NATO anywhere in the text of 
Resolution 1973.21 This omission was not likely an accident of drafting 
even though all Security Council members knew that NATO was the most 
likely entity to intervene. Anthony Aust, ex-legal counselor to the 
permanent mission of United Kingdom to the UN, stated, "Sometimes 
these resolutions are [deliberately] not clear. They are ambiguous because 
it is the only way to avoid a veto."22 The resolution's call for the 
international community of states to act was, in reality, intended for 
NATO, but for the resolution to be approved, an explicit reference to the 
regional arrangement was omitted.
Conclusion
In this short analysis, the evidence indicates that states had already 
decided to intervene in Libya before the UNSC Resolution 1973 was sanc-
tioned. The complexity of the passage of this resolution shows that law 
"happens" in a context, and this context is shaped and bounded by inter-
national politics. The current events and the passivity of the UNSC in the 
situation in Syria also point in this direction.
International law should not be considered as independent of interna-
tional politics, nor vice versa. There is a two-way street through which 
they communicate. A better understanding of the interrelationship 
between the two and their relative impact on the geopolity of modern 
statecraft is needed. Hypotheses that deserve further investigation, on the 
basis of the Libyan example, are whether international law constrains, to 
some extent, international political discourse and decision making, or 
whether if, once political consensus is reached, the pressure to legitimize 
that action results in the "formation" of suitable international law (e.g., 
UNSCR 1973).
Further research is needed to advance our understanding of how interna-
tional politics influences the creation, interpretation, and application of 
international law. One possible approach would be through Robert 
Gilpin's application of realist thinking to contemporary international rela-
tions. This research is especially relevant at a time where issues on 
"humanitarian intervention" are potentially on the rise as justifications 
for intervening in the affairs of states.
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